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Nationalism, War and Social Cohesion 
Siniša Malešević 
 
Abstract 
Most studies of nationalism and war focus on the direct causal relationship between the 
two. Whereas the naturalist theories see strong national attachments as a primary cause of 
war, the formativist approaches understand nationalism as an inevitable product of 
warfare. This paper challenges both of these leading interpretations by problematizing the 
nature of group solidarity in the large scale violent conflicts. The author develops an 
alternative argument that emphasizes the centrality of two institutional processes: 
centrifugal ideologization and the cumulative bureaucratization of coercion. The principal 
argument is that war does not create nationalism neither does nationalism generate wars. 
Instead the development of nationalism owes much to the macro historical institutional 
processes that have little to do with the actual battlefields. 
Keywords: Nationalism, war, ideology, solidarity, violence, bureaucracy  
 
Introduction 
 
Common sense suggests that in times of war social behaviour undergoes dramatic 
change. The presence of actual or perceived threat is often seen as having a direct impact 
on existing social relationships with the escalation of violence polarising groups involved 
in the conflict. The general assumption is that warfare inevitably fosters the emergence of 
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 2 
strong national identities that also entail a lack of solidarity towards those who find 
themselves on the other side of the conflict line. Drawing on these generally accepted 
assumptions, much of contemporary social theory and research see nationalism and war 
as mutually interdependent. Despite the fact that scholars disagree on what comes first, 
nationalism or war, there is near unanimity on the view that the conditions of warfare 
inexorably increase national solidarity. In other words while some argue that excessive 
national bonds contribute to, or even cause wars, others see nationalism as an 
unequivocal consequence of warfare. Even those who are more wary of these 
assumptions such as Van Evera (1994), Comaroff and Stern (1995) and Scheff (2000) do 
not question the causality of this relationship and focus exclusively on the different forms 
of nationalist experience. For example Van Evera’s (1994:5) central research questions 
are: ‘What types of nationalism are most likely to cause war?’ and ‘What background 
conditions catalyze or dampen this causal process?’.  
In contrast to these approaches I outline an alternative conceptual framework that aims on 
the one hand to challenge this taken for granted view, and on the other hand to engage 
more thoroughly with the processes through which micro level solidarity is 
organizationally transformed into macro level nationalist narrative. The key argument is 
that for the most part, nationalism is neither the product nor the cause of war. Instead, the 
relationship between the two is more complex, messy and often unpredictable. Rather 
than acting as an automatic and natural response under conditions of hostility and 
external threat nationalism is heavily dependent on long term organizational and 
ideological support, much of which has little to do with actual warfare. Far from being a 
self-evident and normal reaction to inter-group violent confrontation, national 
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homogenisation is often an untidy, contested and acrimonious process that relies on 
external structural factors. Among these factors two processes stand out: centrifugal 
ideologization and the cumulative bureaucratization of coercion  (Malešević 2010). The 
argument is developed in two parts: first I provide a brief critical analysis of the leading 
explanations that strongly tie social cohesion and nationalism to war and then I articulate 
an alternative hypothetical model that focuses on the crucial role that ideology and social 
organizations play in this process.  
 
 
 
 
Beyond Nature and Nurture: War and National Solidarity 
 
Most studies that tackle the relationship between war, nationalism and group 
homogeneity belong to one of two research traditions: they either see national solidarity 
itself as a cause of organised violence, or alternatively they posit wars as principal 
generators of nationalism. Whereas for one group of scholars – naturalists - cultural 
difference is almost inherently linked to inter-group violence; for others – formativists - it 
is the violence itself that creates such strong cultural and national bonds.  
For sociobiologists such as Van Hooff (1990), Van der Dennen (1995), and Gat (2006) 
the origin and escalation of warfare has a strong genetic basis. In this view organized 
violence is rooted in aggressive dispositions that have evolved over million of years. 
Thus, just as other advanced mammals, humans utilize wars as means of competition 
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over scarce resources and territory with a view of maximizing their reproductive 
potential. In particular attention is given to the behavior of advanced apes such as 
chimpanzees that rely on strategic planning to build coalitions which attack other 
chimpanzees. It is argued that in this sense apes resemble early humans, with both species 
engaging in ‘primitive warfare’ (Van Hooff 1990; Stanford 2001). 
In addition, since most sociobiologists see ethnic and national attachments as an 
extension of kinship, they conceptualize national solidarity as given, primordial and more 
or less automatic. Biological, and by extension cultural, similarities are in themselves 
understood as a principal source of group conflict. Thus for sociobiologists war is a 
product of human genetics, a kin-based violent competition deeply embedded in 
aggressive dispositions and utilized to maximize one’s ‘inclusive fitness’. Simply put, the 
likelihood of organized violent group confrontation stems directly from the group’s 
inherent, genetically developed, ethno-national solidarity.  
While sharing the central premise that strong ethno-national bonding precedes violent 
confrontations, the historical variant of this argument pays less attention to genetics and 
more to the historically documented cases of ethnocentric warfare. In the view of some 
military historians, cultural difference in itself is a potent generator of collective violence. 
Drawing in part on Sun Tzu’s (1971) philosophy of war which emphasizes the strategic 
benefits in knowing the cultural background of one’s enemy a number of influential 
historians argue that war is a direct product of ingrained cultural homogeneity. For 
example for Keegan (1993:46), rather than being a Clausewitzean extension of politics by 
other means, war is ‘the perpetuation of a culture by its own means’. In his view war is an 
expression of culture and as such its occurrences and character are determined by the 
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different ethno-cultural, national and civilizational traditions. In this vein he describes 
post 9/11 warfare as the continuation of ‘older conflict between settled, creative, 
productive Westerners and predatory, destructive Orientals’ (Keegan 2001). Although 
other military historians generally do not go that far in deducing organized violence from 
inherent ‘civilizational’ divides, many tend to identify strong national identification as a 
principal source of warfare. Modern wars in particular are seen as the direct product of 
strong national bonds. For example for Schmitt (1958:7) denial of national self-
determination was a principal cause of the WWI.   
Despite the fact that naturalism contributes to our understanding of the universal genetic 
propensities of human behaviour and is useful in emphasising the historical versatility of 
warfare, it is in itself unable to provide a plausible explanation that links war, nationalism 
and social cohesion. Even if one overlooks the reifying, essentialist and groupist 
discourse of most naturalist analyses, which is occasionally combined with explicit 
orientalist imagery, it is apparent that naturalists have difficulty in explaining the social 
mechanisms of national cohesion. Rather than tracing the dynamics of social action and 
identifying the processes through which homogenisation is achieved most naturalists take 
group solidarity as given. Instead of probing and problematizing group solidarity they 
assume that biological and/or cultural resemblance will inevitably result in organised 
social action. Nevertheless as sociologists have demonstrated on numerous occasions 
(Weber 1968, Brubaker 2004; Malešević, 2006) there is no automatic link between 
cultural or biological similarity and collective action. In other words, declaring oneself to 
be Vietnamese or German does not mean that a particular individual will instinctively act 
in concert with other individuals who share the same national designation. Rather than 
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being a simple impulse that stems from cultural or genetic resemblance, social action 
entails active and prolonged political mobilisation. Furthermore, as only a small number 
of cultural and biological practices can be successfully mobilised, the entire process of 
nationalist mobilisation implies arbitrary selection of cultural or biological traits. For 
nations to become real social actors it is essential that a simple category designation is 
organizationally and ideologically transformed into a conscious, politicised and active 
group (Brubaker 2004; Malešević 2006).   
The second problem with the naturalist argument is its inability to differentiate between 
the large scale sociological process that is warfare and the micro psychological and 
biological stimuli that may or may not be involved in wars. While there is no doubt that 
human beings share much of their emotional and behavioural repertoire with their 
evolutionary predecessors such as fear, anger, or aggression and engage in hostile 
contests, none of these are either sufficient or necessary for war. Since war is a social 
institution that involves violent conflict between two or more social organizations often 
underpinned by conflicting ideological narratives and political goals, it operates 
according to a very different logic to that of animal hostility. Rather than relying on 
simple aggressive impulses, warfare entails rigorous discipline, instrumental rationality, 
regulated division of labour, meticulous organization, and a great deal of emotional 
restraint. In most cases war is the exact opposite of the unimpeded aggressive rage 
present in animal disputes: no army tolerates undisciplined and aggressive individuals 
and most successful military machines have consisted not of ‘Alfa males’ but of highly 
trained, skilled, obedient and well organised soldiers. As technologically advanced wars 
demonstrate, one’s physical robustness, innate hostility or anger are more impediments 
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than advantages on the frontline. Instead what is needed are skills, knowledge and 
discipline in the use of science and technology to operate complex machinery such as 
stealth airplanes, radars, to navigate long distance missiles, submarines, unmanned drones 
and so many other technological devices. Simply put, war is nothing like a personal 
vendetta or a violent aggressive quarrel between two wolves; it is a highly complex, 
historically contingent and socially embedded process that requires organizational and 
ideological reinforcement (Collins 2008; Malešević 2010).  
The third and most problematic aspect of the naturalist argument is the implicit 
assumption that differences in culture or biology are by themselves a source of violent 
conflict. Warfare is seen to be a ubiquitous phenomenon linked to the universal struggle 
of ethnic groups, nations, states, empires or civilizations over power, resources, territory 
and status (Keegan 1993). However if there was any direct causality between violence 
and cultural/biological diversity we would live in a world of rampant and inexorable 
warfare. However, as archeological evidence indicates, for most of our unrecorded 
history humans have lived in very small, loose, egalitarian and nomadic networks of 
bands that rarely exceeded fifty people and were mostly incapable of and unwilling to 
engage in protracted feuds (Service 1978, Fry 2007). Despite the abundance of cultural 
and biological diversity that characterized the life of early humans, there is no 
archeological evidence for warfare among the nomadic foragers and very little for the 
simple sedentary tribes (Textor 1967, Eckhardt 1992, Fry 2007). That is, the origins and 
expansion of warfare are not linked to human diversity. Moreover any attempt to infer the 
existence of national solidarity on the basis of genetics alone is bound to fail as all claims 
to common kinship and shared descent for the large scale entities that are nations cannot 
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 8 
be other than metaphoric: seventy five million Germans could not possibly share the 
same ancestors. Hence rather than being fixed and given, primordial entities, nations are 
dynamic, contingent and changing historical creations. Therefore the naturalist argument, 
in both of its versions, cannot provide a coherent account of the relationship between 
nationalism, war and social cohesion.   
  
The Formativist Alternative  
 
Much of mainstream social theory and research remains focused on turning the naturalist 
argument on its head: nationalism and intensive group solidarity are not the cause of war, 
but the outcome of prolonged inter-group violent confrontations. In other words, national 
attachments are seen not as cultural or biological givens but as historical creation, often 
born through collective experience of violence. The formativist argument is most 
consistently developed in the neo-Durkhemian and rational choice perspectives. Despite 
the fact that both positions concur with view that the national homogenization is a 
product, not the source, of warfare, they disagree on how this process operates.   
For rational choice theorists the intensive bonds of national solidarity originate in the 
instrumental rationality of individuals (Hechter 1995; Fearon 1995; Laitin 2007). Rather 
than being a basis of social action, cultural and biological similarities are viewed as 
individual assets deployed for one’s economic self-interest. The outbreak of war 
undermines the existing market situation and creates an environment of insecurity and 
instability. In such an environment, where key resources are in short supply, the 
dynamics of competition can dramatically change, leading toward the greater 
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appreciation of shared action. Thus a greater national solidarity stems directly from the 
co-ordinated self-interest of agents that tend to utilize their shared cultural markers with a 
view of maximizing utility benefits for the entire group.  In this context even very 
destructive wars can be profitable, as on the one hand they generate intensive national 
solidarity that was lacking before, and on the other hand such newly found national bonds 
can lead towards economic re-organization of the political structure. As Laitin (2007:22) 
argues: ‘civil war is profitable for potential insurgents, in that they can both survive and 
enjoy some probability of winning the state. If there is an economic motive for civil 
war… it is in the expectation of collecting the revenues that ownership of the state 
avails’. Hence for rational choice theorists, national solidarity neither precedes nor 
governs individual action. Instead, in a war situation individual agents make rational 
choices to exploit shared cultural markers for individual benefit and in this process 
unwillingly foster the creation of intensive national solidarity.     
In stark contrast to this view, neo-Durkhemian analyses downplay individual rationality 
and emphasize collective affectivity as decisive in explaining the relationship between 
war, nationalism and social cohesion. Drawing indirectly on Durkheim Smith (1981, 
2009), Hutchinson (2005, 2007) and Marvin and Ingle (1999) analyze the processes 
through which nations are historically articulated as sacred communities. In particular 
they stress the role myths and collective memories of ‘blood sacrifice’ and ‘glorious 
dead’ play in creating enduring national identities. The central focus is on historical 
collective interpretations of inter-group conflicts which establish the boundaries between 
culturally defined entities. For Smith (1981), warfare is one of the most important 
creators of ethno-national historic consciousness. Although he acknowledges the 
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 10 
importance of shared struggle and the presence of external threat for the increase in group 
internal cohesion, this in itself is not enough to forge intensive long term national 
consciousness. Hence what matters more is the collective representation and 
commemoration of past wars. It is through the rituals and practices of collective 
remembering of national martyrs that nationhood is maintained and national solidarity 
reinforced. In this sense, nationalism operates as a civil religion that entails periodic 
worships of totemic, sacrificial, symbols, the presence of which helps establish the 
normative universe of national communities. The commemorations of ‘glorious dead’ set 
up moral parameters for the behaviour of future generations and in this process 
perpetuate a strong national bond grounded in ethical responsibility towards the 
ancestors.   
The formativist alternative is a much more persuasive attempt to explain the link between 
nationalism, war and social cohesion. It provides a broader, more synthetic and complex 
answer that moves away from the biological and psychological analogies towards social 
and political processes such as instrumental rationality and the historical sociology of 
cultural representation. However, this approach still suffers from the three pronounced 
shortcomings: it conflates social action on the micro and macro level; it overemphasizes 
the integrative quality of warfare; and it takes rhetorical claims of sacrifice and killing at 
face value.   
When formativist researchers state that the presence of external threat automatically leads 
towards greater national cohesion, their argument essentially represents an attempt to 
apply the logic of psychological studies to the macro historical level. The general view is 
that large scale collectivities operate in a similar way to that of the micro groups and the 
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individuals interacting in experimental laboratory conditions. Both rational choice 
theorists and neo-Durkhemians posit social solidarity as a universal, trans-historical and, 
for most part, uniform phenomenon. While for neo-Durkhemians, the mechanical 
solidarity of resemblance can replace the organic solidarity of interdependence, with an 
ethnic conscience collective growing into an articulated national identity, for the rational 
choice theorists all solidarity presumes the preexistence of individual self-interest. 
However to properly understand the relationship between nationalism and war it is 
crucial to analytically distinguish between the behavior of individuals in laboratory 
conditions, micro interaction in small, face to face, groups and the organizationally 
mediated social action in the large scale entities that are nations and states. Although 
psychological studies from Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo’s (1971) early experiments to 
more recent research (cf. Druckman 1995) have demonstrated convincingly how easily 
individuals can act cruelly to conform to authority, such studies have proved inadequate 
in explaining the dynamics of micro-group interaction.  
While there is near consensus on the view that anonymous individuals are more likely to 
act violently against other distant and anonymous individuals, even short periods of 
social interaction significantly diminish the potential for cruel behavior. In other words as 
Collins (2008:1-7) argues and amply documents much of human violence is deeply social 
in character. Rather than focusing on violent individuals, the researcher’s attention should 
be on the violent situations ‘which shape the emotions and acts of the individuals who 
step inside them’. In a similar vein rather than being an exclusive propensity of 
individuals, solidarity too is generated through social mechanisms which are neither 
necessarily normative nor instrumental. The key point here is that there is a substantial 
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difference in the way in which social bonds are created and maintained at the micro and 
macro group level. The decades of thorough research on the behavior of soldiers on the 
battlefield has revealed that despite official pronouncements that glorify a soldier’s 
commitment to die for his nation, state, ideology or religious doctrine, most of those who 
made the ultimate sacrifice have done so for a much smaller group: their family, close 
friends or their regimental comrades (Henderson 1985, Bourke 2000; Collins 2008). In 
this sense, most forms of genuine durable solidarity entail a substantial degree of micro-
level contact and face to face interaction. In contrast to the neo-Durkhemian image of 
nationalism as a form of synchronised and all embracing collective effervescence, that 
arises automatically and fills all the pores of a particular society actual macro cohesion 
requires the organizational integration of thousands of micro solidarity networks. 
Secondly, most formativist accounts overemphasize the integrative potential of warfare. 
While there is no doubt that the presence of a direct and real threat might stimulate shared 
feelings of fear, insecurity and anxiety thus fostering the need for a greater cooperation 
and closer attachments, these feelings and needs do not necessarily materialize. The 
history of warfare provides us with numerous examples when the presence of a palpable 
threat acted not as a catalyst for national unity but as a source for its disintegration. For 
example during the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) and the Mexican-American War 
(1846-8) the governments of the attacked states were able neither to galvanize popular 
support nor to generate funds to pay the troops: ‘While the Chilean armies were marching 
on Lima, Peruvian finance minister Quimper suggested a small tax on capital to pay the 
troops in the field. These measures were defeated… as the U.S. army marched towards 
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Mexico City in 1847, the government frantically negotiated with the church and domestic 
lender for funds’ (Centeno 2002:157-158).  
In direct contrast to the view that warfare inevitably enhances national homogeneity, one 
can pinpoint the cases of the late 19th and early 20th century Balkans and South America 
as well as contemporary Africa where the extensive proliferation of wars did not result in 
advancing greater national cohesion (Herbst 2000; Centeno 2002; Gerolymatos 2004). 
Similarly the argument that places emphasis on the cohesive power of war 
commemorations neglects the contextual, and hence often manipulative, character of 
these events. Rather than being a spontaneous and automatic popular reaction, the 
collective worship of national martyrs and ‘our glorious dead’ entail elaborate 
organizational and ideological underpinning. The monuments, cenotaphs, triumphal 
arches and war cemeteries have to be built and maintained by the state; grand public 
ceremonies require a great deal of organizational work, and securing public receptiveness 
necessitates prolonged and effective primary and secondary socialization. As the example 
of pre- and post WWII Japan illustrates well, it is not ar itself that encodes which events 
and actors will be celebrated and commemorated, but the post-war political and cultural 
environment which moulds who, what, when and how will be honored and remembered. 
Although the Yasukuni Shinto shrine built in 1869 before the WWII served in part as a 
monument for the glorification of militaristic nationalism and the Japanese empire from 
1945 onwards, it has acquired a more religious and pietistic role (Nelson 2003). 
Finally, in their attempt to link the rise of national solidarity to war experience, 
formativists exaggerate the role of bloodshed and sacrifice in forging strong national 
attachments. Both rational choice theorists and neo-Durkhemians see willingness to die 
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and kill for one’s nation as the most reliable indicator of intense national solidarity. For 
neo-Durkhemians this is a sign that individuals are well integrated into their nations 
whereby strong national identities often act as a surrogate for religion. In Smith’s and 
Hutchinson’s view intensive national bonds provide meanings and help individuals deal 
with the question of one’s inevitable mortality. For the rational choice theorists, 
willingness to die for others is a form of exchange in which individual autonomy is 
traded off for solidarity. In Wintrobe’s (2006:41) view, since nation is perceived as a 
‘solidarity multiplier’, one is able and willing to make the ultimate sacrifice or kill others 
through the instrumentally rational pursuit of ‘feeling of belonging-ness to a group’.   
Although, as available research shows, self-sacrifice and joint participation in the killing 
of other human beings do help create exceptionally strong bonds among soldiers on the 
battlefield and in other small scale groups such as gangs, terrorists, or insurgents, this 
process does not translate so well at the macro level (Grossman 1995; 2004; Collins 
2008). For one thing, even in total and protracted wars, most individuals are unlikely to 
take part in combat and in modern warfare even the soldiers who fight rarely have the 
opportunity to see the enemy face to face and shoot at them. For example, out of 2.8 
million soldiers who were sent to the Vietnam War, only 300,000, that is around 10%, 
took part in actual battlefields with an even smaller number killing and dying in close 
combat (Gabriel 1987:26-30). As, since the introduction of the cannon onto the 
battlefield, much warfare is fought at long distance the possibility of bonding through 
killing and dying has become remote even for the soldiers let alone civilians.  
Furthermore since both self-sacrifice and killing go so much against the normative 
universe of ordinary upbringing in nearly all social orders, these practices are extremely 
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difficult to perform and most individuals avoid them at all costs. The recent research 
makes apparent that the majority of front line combatants prefer to misfire, shoot in the 
air or not shoot at all rather than to aim at and kill enemy soldiers. Even the most 
experienced soldiers dread close range killings (Grossman 1995, Bourke 2000 and 
Collins 2008). The situation is nearly identical with one’s willingness to die as once they 
reach the battlefield most soldiers become overwhelmed with fear with trembling, violent 
pounding of the heart, vomiting, cold sweat, urination and soiling one’s pants a fairly 
widespread practice (Grossman 1995; Collins 2008). If, even for soldiers on the frontline, 
both sacrifice and killing for the nation remain rare and exceptional events, they are 
highly unlikely to have a decisive impact on the development of national cohesion among 
those who are far away from the battlefields. To sum up, the onset of war and the 
presence of external threat do not automatically translate in the greater national cohesion. 
In order for this to happen, other social processes have to be at work. Let us briefly 
sketch what these processes are.   
 
 
Moulding Social Cohesion: Ideology, Social Organizations and Nations  
 
 
To argue that the strong national bonds are neither the cause nor the consequence of war 
does not mean to suggest that the two phenomena are completely unrelated. The onset of 
war usually influences most aspects of everyday social life where the patterns of 
solidarity rarely stay unaffected. However, the social origins, direction, intensity and 
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duration of social solidarity can never be taken for granted. In particular it is wrong to 
simply assume that the large scale collectivities act similarly to individual agents or 
micro groups. There is nothing natural and automatic in the formation of group solidarity, 
and particularly not for such gargantuan social entities as states and nations. In this 
context the mere presence of an external danger is unlikely to mechanically translate into 
greater national homogeneity. Instead the construction of social cohesion at the macro 
level is for the most part a historically contingent, messy and complex process involving 
events, actions and practices that often have little or nothing to do with the actual 
battlefields. The fact that in the modern age, wars are often satiated with widespread 
nationalist enthusiasm does not mean that one phenomenon is caused by the other nor 
that one is bound to trigger the other. Rather, I argue that a better understanding of how 
national cohesion is achieved requires re-focusing our attention to the origins and 
workings of two historical processes that shape this relationship: centrifugal 
ideologization and the cumulative bureaucratization of coercion (Malešević 2010). In 
what follows I outline a conceptual framework that theoretically explores the impact of 
these two processes on the development of national cohesion in the modern era. The aim 
is not to formulate an alternative causal theory of the relationship between nationalism 
and war but, more modestly, to critically examine the role social organizations and mass 
ideologization play in forging an ‘illusory correlation’ between these two phenomena.  
 
 
Ideology as a Mass Phenomenon 
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There is nothing obvious in expressing solidarity with one’s co-nationals. As students of 
nations and nationalism have extensively documented for much of our history, an 
individual’s sense of attachment rarely expanded beyond the locality and close kinship 
networks (Weber 1978; Hobsbawm 1990; Breuilly 1994). Even when nationalism 
emerged as a fully fledged ideology in the second half of the 18th century it still, for most 
part, remained a preserve of the cultural, economic and political elites and some middle 
class groups influenced by the philosophies of Enlightenment and Romanticism 
(Leerssen 2006; Hroch 1985). It took hundreds of years for nationalist discourse to 
become a widespread phenomenon, a trans-class ideology shared by an overwhelming 
majority of populations throughout the world. Since normative ideological doctrines were 
largely a creation of cultural and political elites, and have slowly and gradually 
permeated different layers of society, relying in the process on the structural power of 
various social movements and organizations, I call this process a centrifugal 
ideologization (Malešević 2010: 8-11). The fact that this phenomenon originates at the 
top of social pyramid does not suggest that the process itself is top-down, one 
dimensional. Instead its prevalence and intensity are determined by the active 
participation of various social agents: not only state institutions such as the education, 
mass media, military, police and administrative agencies but also social movements, civil 
society networks and family units.   
While the pre-modern world relied on the legitimizing power of myths and religions, the 
modern era necessitates the emergence of coherent and all embracing ideological 
doctrines able to maintain a hold on millions of largely independent individuals. The 
classical sociologists from Ibn Khaldun, Toennies, Marx, Weber to Durkheim 
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comprehended well how the profound structural difference between modernity and its 
historical predecessors: far greater impersonal and blasé relations, individual autonomy, 
the general shift from normative to more utilitarian relationships, the emergence of an 
elaborate and advanced division of labour, the weakening of broader kinship bonds at the 
expense of contractual arrangements and the ever increasing rationalisation of social 
action. Hence, one of the central problems in modernity is how to develop and sustain 
solidarity among millions of autonomous and impersonal individuals who are unlikely to 
ever meet over nine-tenth of their co-nationals.  
This also has a direct impact on individual behaviour in times of war:  whereas in the pre-
modern world an attack on the village would quickly galvanise unity among those who 
know and trust each other and who find themselves under clear danger, the involvement 
of a large state in an overseas military adventure might have no impact at all, or could 
even act negatively, on the social cohesion of its citizens. Thus unlike bands, tribes, 
chiefdoms, city states and empires, modern nation-states require a different form of social 
cement to hold its citizenry together. I argue that it is centrifugal, mass, ideologization 
that provides this cement as, when successful, it acts as an organizational surrogate for 
genuine social solidarity. In other words, to generate and maintain a degree of social 
cohesion within the nation-state, it becomes necessary to attempt to replicate the intimacy 
and trust of the face to face interaction on this macro level. Paradoxically and 
indicatively, nationalist rhetoric insists on the warmth and emotional cosiness of 
communal and kinship-like ties at the very moment when such ties are in the process of 
disintegration. As Gellner (1983: 124) astutely put it nationalism inverts reality: ‘it claims 
to defend folk culture while in fact is forging a high culture; it claims to protect an old 
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folk society while in fact helping to build up an anonymous mass society’. Despite the 
strenuous attempts of nationalist ideologues and state authorities to portray an 
uninterrupted continuity between the pre-modern and modern forms of group 
attachments, nationalism is a profoundly different and historically novel phenomenon 
(Mann 1993; Hobsbawm 1990; Breuilly 1993; Malešević 2006).  In contrast to rigid 
medieval status hierarchies where one’s feeling of solidarity and group loyalty rarely, if 
ever, expanded beyond and below one’s social rank, and where for overwhelming 
numbers of individuals one’s entire social universe coincided with one’s village of birth, 
modernity entailed dramatic increase in both territorial and social mobility.  
Although this centrifugal process of ideologization is rooted in concrete structural 
changes such as the standardization of vernacular languages, the growth of large scale 
public educational systems, a dramatic increase in literacy, state centralization, the 
expansion of military draft, and the availability of cheap, nation-wide, mass media 
(Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Mann 1993), its successful proliferation also entails the 
ongoing, and almost never ending, political mobilization of civil society, family and other 
local networks. To generate a shared feeling of attachment which would incorporate 
millions of autonomous and anonymous individuals, it was essential to bind the 
thousands of pockets of micro-solidarity into a coherent and believable macro-nationalist 
narrative. Since solidarity is a fragile ‘commodity’ that requires permanent affirmation 
and reinforcement, it is much more easily achieved through direct face to face interaction 
and physical contact (Collins 2008) than through symbolic projections of ‘an image of 
one’s communion’ (Anderson 1983). In the modern era of anonymous and cold 
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Gesellschaft, where there is little genuine warmth of Gemeinschaft, it is ideology that acts 
as a principal provider of ontological security for large number of individuals.  
It is not only that centrifugal ideologization ‘invites the masses into history’ (Nairn 
1977:340), but it also keeps them there by maintaining an enduring ideological 
scaffolding through the institutions of modern state and though civil society groupings. 
As Billig (1995) has noted, much of this ideological support is articulated through the 
practices and ideas of banal nationalism. That is, the strength of nationalism is better 
gauged by its habitual pervasiveness than by its venomous outbursts and rallying calls: a 
hot, emotional, ‘red in tooth and claw’ type of nationalism, is an intense but rare and 
transitory phenomenon, while cold, ordinary and routine nationalism is stable and 
enduring. Centrifugal ideologization is so pervasive precisely because it is encored in 
unnoticeable, ordinary and taken for granted processes and events: the routine, tacit and 
everyday rhetoric of mass media, educational institutions, advertising, political speeches, 
entertainment, administrative orders, stamps, bank notes and even meteorological 
broadcasts. Both Barthes (1993) and Bourdieu (1990) have demonstrated convincingly 
that much ideological power is generated through normalization and enhabitation: what is 
seen as obvious, normal and natural is rarely questioned. The idea that a nation, class or 
race are self-evident and objective forms of being entails the existence of what Bourdieu 
(1990) calls doxic experience: the deep-founded, acquired, almost unconscious values, 
beliefs and practices. Thus centrifugal ideologization normalizes and naturalizes 
nationhood as a fundamental cognitive category and an essential social practice. 
Nevertheless what is missing in Billig’s account are the social agents who are not simply 
objects of ideologization but are active participants in this process. Weber (1978), 
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Simmel (1990) and Elias (2000) have all emphasized the role of rational self-disciplining 
as crucial for modernity. Whereas for Weber, Calvinism was the true predecessor of 
ascetic ethics, ‘methodical control’ and eventually rationalization of one’s life, for 
Simmel modernity promotes calculability: because human actions become centred on 
long term goals they are more prone towards utilitarian behavior and the internalization 
of social constraint. Similarly, Elias emphasizes the changing character of interpersonal 
conduct, with focus on the control of one’s emotions, bodily functions, table manners and 
forms of speech.  This personal conditioning is integral to the process of centrifugal 
ideologization as it gradually helps project internal social hierarchies outside of one’s 
society. By internalizing values and practices associated with being a good and 
responsible German or Pole one is able to symbolically raise one’s own prestige at the 
expense of the excluded Other. In other words by embracing a routine nationalist 
narrative large sections of the population are in position to tie their own social status to 
that of their nation, while simultaneously denying such exceptional qualities to other 
(potentially adversary) societies. In this sense, nationalism is almost the exact opposite of 
pre-modern forms of prejudice: rather than being dependent on the sporadic and arbitrary 
emotional outbursts of hatred that could relate to any individual and loosely defined 
collectivity, it entails implementation of relatively systematic, coherent ideological 
blueprints that depend on the utilitarian and value rationality of masses. Bauman (1989) 
clearly demonstrates that there is a qualitative difference between the sporadic outbursts 
of anti-Semitic, religiously and mythically inspired, rage that characterized the traditional 
world and the methodical, efficient, almost scientific and highly regulated ideological 
enterprise of the ‘final solution’. Nationalism operates most competently through habit 
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and routine of cold and calculated rationality not through sudden eruptions of 
uncontrolled emotions. Hence centrifugal ideologization involves both the institutional 
proliferation of ideas and practices as well as subjective self-disciplining, both of which 
make ideology, and in this case nationalism, a normal, mundane and self-evident 
discursive practice shared by a large majority of people. Simply put, rather than being a 
creation of warfare nationalism develops long before any sign of upcoming inter-state 
violence.  
 
Social Organizations and National Cohesion 
 
Centrifugal ideologization is a potent historical device for the transformation of micro 
level solidarities into macro level nationalist narratives. However, its very existence and 
expansion depend heavily on the workings of concrete social organizations. Since Weber 
(1978) it has become apparent that complex social orders operate much better when 
patrimonial and nepotistic traditional authority is replaced with the legal and instrumental 
rationality of bureaucratic rule. The gradual historical shift from traditional forms of 
domination based on the personal whim of rulers towards those rooted in the impersonal 
rule of abstract laws was crucial in legitimising modern social orders. However, what is 
often neglected in this sanguine diagnosis of modernity is the fact that the bureaucratic 
form of organization is no less domineering than its traditional counterparts. On the 
contrary, its operational effectiveness and its historical success are grounded in its 
coercive character. Not only are modern administrative organizations profoundly (albeit 
transparently) hierarchical, with clearly defined divisions of labour and responsibility, but 
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they are also able to successfully and legitimately enforce mass obedience on a scale 
traditional authorities were never able to achieve. By privileging knowledge, instrumental 
efficiency and institutional teleology, bureaucratic organizations have proved capable of 
imposing strict discipline, social control and organizational loyalty. The fact that 
bureaucratic organization is nominally articulated as open to social mobility, meritocracy 
and transparency, makes it more coercive rather than less, as disobedience to such a 
legitimate authority is swiftly reprimanded and punished with little resistance. In contrast 
to common sense views that see modernity, and in particular bureaucratic organization of 
rule, as less coercive than its historical predecessors, the opposite is the case. All 
bureaucracy entails discipline and all discipline presupposes control and acquiescence. 
Nevertheless, what is central to note is the gradual and constant expansion of bureaucratic 
power. The coercive reach and penetration of social organizations has been on the 
increase over the last 10,000 years with the last two centuries witnessing a dramatic 
escalation (Malešević 2010: 92-120). Once modern social organizations managed to 
monopolize the use of violence over vast and clearly demarcated territories, they were 
also able to swiftly mobilize and recruit entire societies to confront competing social 
organizations that, in turn, maintained hold on their own societies.  
Consequently, the proliferation of bureaucratic control was decisive in changing the 
character of violent confrontation. While in earlier epochs violence was macabre and 
gruesome but largely limited in scope in the modern era morbidity has been replaced by 
surgical efficiency, evidenced in spectacular increase in mass slaughter. For example, as 
Eckhard’s (1990) meticulous study demonstrates, the global war casualties go hand in 
hand with the expansion of state power: whereas in the combined 10th and 11th centuries 
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all war deaths amounted to no more than 60,000 people, in the joint 16th and 17th 
centuries this figure leaps to nearly 8 million dead. However the last two hundred years 
and in particular the 20th century represent the pinnacle of mass killings with 19 million 
war casualties in 19th century and 111 million in the 20th century alone. All of this 
indicates that the bureaucratization of coercion is a cumulative historical process whereby 
the increase in strength, size and reach of social organizations is paralleled with the rise 
of their destructive potential. Since warfare is not, as sociobiologists would have it, an 
inter-group feud written large but a highly coordinated violent contest between two or 
more social organizations, as these organizations grow and expand, so does war. Hence 
the gradual increase in the rationalisation of social action has its pronounced dark side: as 
the infrastructural and bureaucratic capacities of states spread and grow and as social 
organizations became more complex, pervasive and instrumentally rational, their malign 
propensities increase.  
This is best illustrated by analysing social orders which are commonly seen as 
underdeveloped and less modernized, such as Rwanda in 1990s. Despite popular 
perceptions which saw Rwandan genocide as a continuation of pre-modern tribalism, its 
preparation and execution owe a great deal to the cumulative bureaucratization of 
coercion and to centrifugal ideologization. Firstly no pre-modern rulers possessed 
technology, social organization or ideology to implement mass killings on such a scale 
and at such a speed, but more importantly, were it not for the proliferation of profoundly 
modernist principles and practices, it is highly unlikely that Rwandan genocide would 
have happened at all. The genocide was a systematic and highly organised event that 
relied on pre-existing bureaucratic machinery and well articulated ideological blueprints. 
Page 24 of 32
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 25 
By the late 1980s Rwanda boasted developed road and communication networks, good 
education and health system, a stable economy with low inflation and miniscule foreign 
debt, relatively high literacy rates, an extensive, well run and largely non-corrupt 
administrative apparatus (Prunier 1997, Hintjens 2001, Taylor 1999) all of which gained 
her the reputation of being ‘the Switzerland of Africa’. More importantly this was a 
remarkably centralised and ordered state with ‘chillingly purposeful bureaucratic control’ 
(Oplinger 1990:260) very disciplined civil service and a political culture that encouraged 
‘systematic and unconditional obedience to authority’ (Prunier, 1997: 141). 
Consequently, the execution of genocide was conducted with utmost speed and efficiency 
coordinated from the highest political and bureaucratic authority (Reyntjens 1996:245). 
Rather than being an irrational explosion of uncontrolled and emotional butchery the 
killing was highly organized, controlled and directed ‘by the civil servants in the central 
government, prefets, bourgmestres and local councilors’ (Prunier 1997:247). As 
Mamdani (2001:144) convincingly demonstrates ‘the administrative machinery of the 
local state was key to organizing the series of massacres that constituted the genocide’. 
Thus the proliferation of violence in modernity entails reliance on the disciplinary effects 
of social organizations. It is modern bureaucratic machines that make systematic killing 
possible by discouraging disobedience and by transferring responsibility to higher chains 
in the hierarchy.  
However, the cumulative bureaucratization of coercion can not operate successfully 
without centrifugal ideologization. It is mass ideologies that provide justification and 
ethical comfort for all those enveloped by the bureaucratic machine. The cold and 
routinized character of everyday nationalism, generated by processes of centrifugal 
Page 25 of 32
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 26 
ideologization synchronizes with the indifferent, unemotional and highly instrumental 
moral codes of bureaucratic organizations. Just as banal nationalism does not require 
battle cries and exuberant outbursts of hatred but is encored in almost invisible repetition 
and routinization of nationalist symbols and practice, so modern social organizations 
privilege and prioritize orderly obedience, delegation of tasks and detached 
professionalism over passionate and impulsive commitments for a specific cause. 
Bureaucratic organization bestows a coercive environment where social action is 
routinized and trivialized, while centrifugal ideologization imprints meanings on these 
processes and in this way provides the glue that holds the nation-state together. Since 
everyday, banal nationalism is nothing but a habitual expression of loyalty to a concrete 
social organization (i.e. nation-state), it is bound to operate according to a logic which 
mirrors other forms of bureaucratic ethics. In particular this means that it provides a 
teleological blueprint that on the one hand allows for the smooth operation of social 
organizations and on the other, galvanizes routinized popular support for the actions of 
these social organizations. As Rwandan example sho s, the trigger that transformed the 
cumulative bureaucratization of coercion into genocidal action was centrifugal 
ideologization. From the colonially imposed, fixed and mutually exclusive ethnic 
categorisations, through the Hamitic ideology of Tutsi supremacy, to the Hutu Power 
counter-ideology codified in the Bahutu Manifesto of 1957, it was popularized 
ideological doctrines that paved the way for organized slaughter (Hintjens 1999; 
Mamdani 2001). Hence, despite its relative economic underdevelopment, Rwanda was a 
society with high levels of cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and extensive 
centrifugal ideological penetration.   
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Therefore rather than causing war or being a cause of war nationalism remains a highly 
autonomous phenomenon with its own dynamics, a dynamics that has been and remains 
shaped by two long term historical processes – cumulative bureaucratization of coercion 
and centrifugal ideologization.  Although these two processes can not possibly account 
for all aspects of relationship between war and national homogeneity it seems highly 
unlikely that social orders which operate under low levels of bureaucratization and 
ideologization can in times of war easily transform local solidarities into an all embracing 
nationalist discourse. As European history shows so well, excessive violence requires 
elaborate social organization underpinned by believable popular ideologies: whereas 
medieval warfare was a prerogative of small group of aristocrats engaged in the highly 
ritualistic brawls with few casualties and no support from the wider (peasant) population, 
the modern era gave birth to total wars that involved the mutual destruction of millions of 
highly organised and ideologically mobilized citizenry. Hence the outbreak of war and 
the presence of external threat do not automatically translate into greater national 
solidarity: the escalation of virulent nationalism owes much to its organizational and 
ideological embeddedness.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although much of contemporary social theory and research posits a strong and even 
inexorable link between nationalism and war these two phenomena in fact exhibit much 
more autonomy. Despite conventional views that associate the outbreak of war with the 
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automatic eruption of nationalist euphoria there is nothing inevitable and natural in this 
relationship. Rather than being a direct and instinctive extension of kin solidarity 
nationalism is a complex social process that relies on continuous organizational and 
ideological support. Similarly, neither is war an augmented, aggressive crowd tussle but a 
highly organised and ideologized political confrontation involving antagonistic social 
organizations. Hence to understand the relationship between war and nationalism it is 
paramount to look at their structural origins, both of which, I argue, have been shaped by 
long term processes – cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal 
ideologization. It is the historical development of these two macro processes that has a 
decisive impact on whether the break-out of a particular war will result in a greater 
national homogenization. Following this hypothetical model it is argued that a greater 
bureaucratization of social order and a more pervasive ideological penetration of society - 
involving both the institutional spread of ideas and practices as well as subjective self-
disciplining - are more likely to create conditions for stronger nationalist homogenization 
in times of war.  The next step is to empirically verify or falsify this theoretical 
framework.  
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